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6 1 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
7 
8 [ Case No. 920115-CA 
9 I ) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
10 
11 
12 | Plaintiff/appellant admits he did not send a Notice Of Claim to thej 
13 Attorney General and the notice to County Attorney Bunderson was not 
14 within one year, but he did give notice to defendant/appellee Carolyn 
15 I Smith on April 17, 1989, within one year after she illegally turned his| 
16 I Medicaid records over to the police. The original of this faxed notice 
17 fflwas within the records of Kipp And Christian, P.C. and not discovered] 
18 until after her Motion To Dismiss had passed. 
19 Medicaid is funded by the federal government, and there are no 
20 notice requirements where federal rights are involved. The leading state! 
21 court case rejecting the application of a notice of claim requirements] 
22 to § 1983 actions in state courts is Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 
23 I 841, 548 P.2d 1125, 1129-30, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457-58 (1976), in which) 
24 Justice Mosk, writing for a unanimous court, stated that: 
25 | "The purpose underlying section 1983 — i.e., to serve as an 
I antidote to discriminatory laws, to protect federal rights 
26 where state law is inadequate, and to protect federal rights 
where state processes are available in theory but not in 
27 practice . . . may not be frustrated by state substantive 
limitations couched in procedural language." Cf. Edwards v. Hare, 
28 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
1 Defendant/appellee Carolyn Smith violated the Code Of Federal 
2 Regulations by turning the Medicaid records over to the police andj 
3 lallowing herself and the records to be subpoeaned. 
4 I A State plan must provide, under a State statute, that imposes 
1 legal sanctions, safeguards meeting the requirements of this subpart 
5 that restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants! 
and recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration! 
6 of the plan. 42 C.F.R. § 431.301 
7 If a court issues a subpoena for a case record or for any agency 
representative to testify concerning an applicant or recipient, the| 
8 agency must advise the court of the confidential nature of the records. 
42 C.F.R. § 431.306(f). 
9 
10 J Burns v. Reed, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (1991) abolished prosecutorial! 
11 immunity for out-of-court activities. Clearly the decision to prosecute) 
12 I plaintiff/appellant was an administrative act. Signing an information, 
13 advising the police in their investigation, and subpoening Mrs. Smith| 
14 & Cheryl Andreason & the records provided only qualified immunity to 
15 defendant/appellee Jon J. Bunderson. 
16 When there was a contingent fee agreement, suing by attorneyj 
17 Michael L. Miller before any settlement was malicious prosecution. 
18 Taking a default judgment against plaintiff/appellant when there was an| 
19 answer on file and after another attorney had been paid a contingent 
20 fee, was an abuse of process. 
21 The Supreme Court Of Utah had previoulsy denied Appelleel 
22 Bunderson's Motion For Summary Dismissal of this appeal which indicated 
23 it was not without merit and frivolous enough to justify any award of| 
24 costs and attorneys fees. 
25 Proof Of Service 
26 I hereby certify that on October 24. 1992 I faxed the foregoing toj 
Karra J. Porter, Attorney At Law, Debra J. Moore, Assistant Attorney 
27 General, and mailed a copy to Michael L. Miller, Attorney At Law, 75| 
East 300 North, #3, St. George, Utah 84770. 
28 
OCAV- f i r . ?v^+"U 
Ch. 18 9S7 
4, In such cases it'Tppeart t * b* ag, eed thai there must be j *ibHc 
disclosure of the private facta. Thus there w no invasion of privacy where 
defendant meiely calls the plaintiffs employer and asks his help m col-
lecting a debt from the plaintiff. Household Finance Corp. v Bridge 
(1969) 252 M6 531 250 A 2d 878, Harrison v. Humble Oil & Bef Go, 
(DJS.C.1967) 264 F.Supp to, l i inper le /v Chase Collection Service 11969) 
272 CaLApp.2d 697, 7? Cal Rpp 7<fcr Se*> Not* U ^ S ) S6 Brook.LRev. 95 
The only case to the contra^ is Park v Wise (La*App,I964) 155 Soifcl 
909, writ refused 246 La 84, 157 So,2d 231. 
But there may be other bases o t j ^ j l k j i l t t Peterson v. ldahf JPirat 
Nat. Bank (1961* 83 Idaho 678, {dtfTTM 2g3Q the private disclosure of 
plaintiff's finances by a brnk w^TTeTorlioT*f6Tr»t an invasion of privacj, 
but a tort action was heid to he for^  breach of t&e qonfii(tential relation 
Cf. Copley v. Northwestern Mut UiTTSTnCSoTTSB W VlW^T^TT: 
Supp, 93 (disclosure to plaintiffs competitors of infonnaUot} suppled to 
defendant insurance company to qualify for insurance), 
4. Compare Banks v King Features Syndicate K^ D.N Y.1939 "i0 F 
Supp, 352 (newspaper publication of X-rays of woman** pelvic region;; 
Feeney v. Young 11920* 191 App Div 501, 181 NY.S 481 (pubb* exhibi-
tion of films of caesarian operation}* Griffin v* Medical Society (1939) 
7 Miso2d 649, 11 N Y.S.2d 109 (publication in medical journal of pictures 
of plaintiffs deformed nose J . 
I 
6* There is general agreement that there is no liability for the l i s -
closure of facts which a n a matter of public record* since they are already 
public Meetze v. Associated Press (1956) 230 SC. 330, 96 SM2& 60S 
(dates of birth and marriage); Stryker v. Republic Picture Corp. (1951; 
108 CaLApp.2d 191, 238 P*2d 670 (military service record); Bell v. 
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.
 vKy.l9b6) 402 S.W,2d 84 (tax de-
linquency) ; ci. Home Sentinel Co. v. Boustedt (1964) 43 Misc,2d 698, 252 
N,Y.S.2d 10 (death certificate), How, then, is the principal case to be 
distinguished? 
6* There are serious questions as to how far the principal case, and 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended. Jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court prior to transfer was proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In his Opening Brief, appellant states that he "won't 
challenge the dismissal of Defendants Mary Miller and Jon J. 
Bunderson but believes award of attorney's fees is not warranted." 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5.) The sole issue to be decided 
regarding respondent Bunderson, therefore, is whether the district 
court properly awarded him reasonable attorney fees under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's determination that 
plaintiff's claims were meritless is a conclusion of law, reviewed 
by this Court for correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 
203-04 (Utah App. 1991). The district court's finding that 
plaintiff's claims were asserted in bad faith may be overturned 
only if clearly erroneous. Id. at 204. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13: 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of 
1 
employment, or under color of authority# is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises, ... regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1) , but 
only if the court: 
(a) Finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) The court enters in the record the reason 
for not awarding fees under the provision of 
Subsection (1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceeding 
Plaintiff/Appellant Gordon E. Johnson ("Johnson") filed suit 
against respondent Bunderson and others alleging breach of 
confidential relationship, malicious prosecution, and abuse of 
process. (R.l-10). The district court initially quashed service 
against the Miller defendants (R.032-33). After proper service had 
been obtained on defendant Mary Miller, the district court granted 
summary judgment in her favor on November 29, 1990 (R.lll), and 
denied a motion to vacate the judgment on March 21, 1991. (R.127). 
The district court dismissed defendants Carolyn Smith and Bear 
2 
River Social Services, based upon Johnson's failure to comply with 
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, on July 5, 
1991. (R.209-10) . 
On September 30, 1991, the district court granted summary 
judgment to this respondent ("Bunderson"). The court ruled that 
Johnson's claims against Bunderson were barred by the doctrine of 
prosecutorial immunity and, in the alternative, that Johnson had 
failed to comply with the provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. In its order, the district court also reaffirmed all 
prior orders entered in the case, and dismissed any remaining 
claims against the defendants. Finally, the court found that 
plaintiff's claims against Bunderson were merit less and asserted in 
bad faith, and awarded Bunderson attorney fees in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. (R.263-64, 276-77). 
Statement of Facts 
The following facts were uncontroverted below: 
Respondent Bunderson was county attorney in and for the county 
of Box Elder, State of Utah, at all relevant times. In 1988, 
Johnson submitted an application form to Bear River Social Services 
which included a handwritten note that on July 20, 1988, he would 
be in jail for killing a judge, an attorney, and a doctor. (See 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Exhibit E.) The threats reached the 
attention of the police and, eventually, County Attorney Bunderson. 
It was reported to Bunderson that the judge in question was the 
Honorable Robert W. Daines, and the attorney was respondent Michael 
3 
L. Miller. The doctor's identity was not specified. (R.86, 170/ 
179) . Following a review of the evidence and the law, Bunderson 
caused charges to be filed against Johnson arising out of the 
threats and other related conduct. (R.86, 170, 179). 
Upon trial to the bench in September 1988, appellant was 
acquitted of telephone harassment and convicted of assault on an 
elected official. (R.171, 179). Appellant appealed his 
conviction, which was subsequently affirmed by this Court. (Case 
No. 880586-CA, June 5, 1989.) (R.171, 179). In its decision, this 
Court stated, "[t]here was sufficient circumstantial evidence that 
defendant intended the threats made," and "we firmly reject 
defendant's argument that his threats were made in jest or were 
just part of a request for medical or legal assistance because he 
was about to be arrested. Such thinking cannot ever rationalize or 
justify expressions which threaten physical harm or, in this case, 
death to anyone." (R.007). This Court also held that the 
handwritten notes on the application form were not privileged. 
(R.007, para.4). 
On June 29, 1990, more than a year after his conviction was 
affirmed, Johnson filed this action setting forth state law claims 
against Bunderson and others. The Complaint was captioned "Breach 
of a Confidential Relationship, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of 
Process," and sought recovery of $1 million from each defendant. 
(R.l-2). Appellant's cause of action against Bunderson was set 
forth in paragraph V: 
4 
Defendant Jon J. Bunderson selectively prosecuted 
plaintiff to drain his time and resources from his 
lawsuit with friend Miller and from Mendocino (Calif.) 
Sup. Ct. 48175 in which Mr. Bunderson represented 
defendants. 
During the course of the litigation, Johnson also alleged that 
Bunderson acted improperly by eliciting testimony at trial about 
the application form, which Johnson asserted was privileged. 
(R.200-01). 
Johnson did not file a notice of claim with Box Elder County 
prior to instituting his lawsuit. (R.171, 179). In the court 
below, Johnson admitted that "[he] was aware of the one-year notice 
requirements, but he could not commence this action while he was 
still on probation until September 1989. Otherwise, Judge Baldwin 
might have revoked the probation had he known plaintiff were not 
repentant and suing those responsible for his harassment." Johnson 
asserted that his claimed fear of retribution excused his non-
compliance under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36, which provides that the 
statute of limitations is tolled for mental incompetence. (R.182). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's award of attorney fees under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 was appropriate. Johnson's claims against 
Bunderson were wholly unsupported by law or fact, and ignored 
previous express rulings by this Court. It was well-established 
that persons acting in a prosecutorial capacity are absolutely 
immune from suit, and that a notice of claim must be given under 
5 
state law in any event. Johnson offered no arguable basis for 
disregarding these basic principles, and brought his claims solely 
as retaliation against those involved in prosecuting him for 
threatening a judge and others. The district court's determination 
that Johnson's claims against Bunderson were meritless was correct, 
and his finding that Johnson acted in bad faith was not clearly 
erroneous. The fee award should therefore be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS AGAINST BUNDERSON WERE MERITLESS AND 
IN BAD FAITH, AND WARRANTED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
I. JOHNSON'S CLAIMS WERE CLEARLY BARRED BY 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Johnson's claims against Bunderson were based upon state law. 
(R.l-10). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 requires a plaintiff to file 
with the County a written notice of any claim against a county 
employee arising out of the course of his or her employment. 
Failure to do so within one year of the conduct complained of is 
fatal to a plaintiff's claims: 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises, ... regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. 
6 
Johnson knew that his cause of action, if any, against 
Bunderson arose in 1988, when Bunderson prosecuted him for making 
the threats. Johnson filed no written notice of his claim at all, 
and did not even file his Complaint until June 29, 1990, well 
beyond one year from the date of the challenged conduct. Johnson 
admitted that he had not complied with the statutory notice 
provisions, but filed suit anyway. (Statement of Facts, supra, 
pages 5-6.) His only excuse, a claimed fear of retaliation from 
Judge Baldwin, was completely unsubstantiated and unreasonable. 
Johnson's complaint plainly constituted the type of inappropriate 
conduct contemplated by Section 78-27-56. 
II. APPELLANT'S CLAIMS AGAINST BUNDERSON WERE 
BARRED BY THE WELL-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE 
OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY. 
All of the actions undertaken by defendant Bunderson of which 
Johnson complained arose out of Bunderson's performance of his 
duties as county prosecutor, i.e., prosecuting Johnson and 
eliciting testimony regarding the document on which the threats 
were written. It has long been established that prosecutors are 
absolutely immune from actions arising out of their prosecutorial 
duties. MA public prosecutor acting in his official capacity is 
absolutely privileged to initiate, institute, or continue criminal 
proceedings." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 656. "The privilege 
stated in this Section is absolute. It protects the public 
prosecutor against inquiry into his motives, and from liability, 
7 
even though he knows that he has no probable cause for the 
institution of the proceedings and initiates them for an altogether 
improper purpose." Id., Comment b. 
In Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed. 2d 
128 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that absolute 
immunity for prosecutors is well settled under the common law, and 
explained the policies underlying the doctrine: 
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the 
same considerations that underlie the common law 
immunities of judges and grant jurors acting within the 
scope of their duties. These include concern that 
harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a 
deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public 
duties, and the possibility that he would shade his 
decisions instead of exercising the independence of 
judgment required by his public trust. 
Id. at 422-23, 96 S.Ct. at 991. 
Prior to the district court's order in this case, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that absolute immunity insulates prosecutors from 
liability in performing prosecutorial functions, including 
eliciting allegedly inappropriate testimony in official 
proceedings. Burns v. Reed, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (1991). 
Throughout the litigation below, Johnson consistently 
complained that Bunderson elicited misleading testimony at trial, 
and/or elicited testimony about the allegedly privileged document 
on which the threats appeared. (R.137, 181, 201-02). As noted 
above, the law has always been clear that prosecutors are 
absolutely immune from such claims. Furthermore, this Court had 
already rejected Johnson's contentions in its affirmance of 
8 
Johnson's conviction, including rulings on the effect of 
Bunderson's alleged motivation and the fact that the document was 
not privileged. (R.007). 
Appellant offered no authority to resist application of 
immunity, other than a Seventh Circuit case which applied the 
immunity doctrine in the context of giving legal advice. Burns v. 
Reed, 894 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1990). Johnson argued that, because 
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Seventh Circuit 
case, he "reasonably believed that absolute immunity for 
prosecuting attorneys would be abolished." (R.220). The Seventh 
Circuit, however, made clear that the only controversial legal 
concept at issue in Burns was its application of absolute immunity 
to rendering of legal advice. While appellate courts differed on 
that issue, there was no dispute that absolute immunity applied to 
traditional prosecutorial functions. Johnson's alleged reliance on 
the grant of certiorari was unreasonable.1 
After judgment was entered by the district court, Johnson 
attempted to recharacterize his claim against Bunderson to 
encompass rendering legal advice to the police concerning 
admissibility of the document in question. (R.281-82). In Burns, 
supra. the Supreme Court held that qualified, rather than absolute, 
immunity may apply to such claims. 
1
 The U.S. Supreme Court has also admonished that the 
disposition of writs of certiorari has no precedential effect. 
Hopfmann v. Connollyf 471 U.S. 459, 461 (1985). Johnson's claimed 
reliance was thus unreasonable on this ground as well. 
9 
Johnson's attempt was inappropriate for several reasons, 
however. First, Johnson did not raise the contention before the 
district court, and therefore this Court should not consider it on 
appeal. Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah 
App. 1991). Second, Johnson offered no support for his new claim 
except for a brief quotation from the trial transcript in which 
Bunderson elicited testimony that the witness had turned the 
application form over to the police. (R.281). From that quote, 
Johnson argued that "Mr. Bunderson should have advised the police 
that federal regulations prohibited disclosure of federally funded 
public assistance [records]." (R.281). 
This belated argument exemplifies Johnsons willingness to 
assert indiscriminate claims against Bunderson, regardless of 
whether he has any factual or legal basis for the claim. Johnson 
did not allege that Bunderson did give advice to the police, 
possibly implicating Burns, but only that he should have. In 
addition to the speculative nature of Johnson's claim, and its 
improper desire to dictate how prosecutors should perform, the 
argument also ignores this Court7s previous holding that the 
document was not privileged. (R.007).2 
2
 The undisputed facts of this case make clear that 
qualified immunity would bar Johnson's claims against Bunderson in 
any event. To defeat application of the doctrine, Johnson would 
have to show that Bunderson violated a clearly established right of 
which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 
Johnson obviously could not show that eliciting testimony about the 
application form violated such a clearly established right, when 
10 
Johnson never offered any arguable factual or legal basis for 
any of his claims against Bunderson. He simply sought to retaliate 
against all those who were involved in his prosecution. Johnson's 
personal animosity against Bunderson was perhaps best expressed in 
one of Johnson's numerous district court pleadings, in which he 
wrote: "It is difficult to understand why Mr. Bunderson prosecuted 
plaintiff for calling Mrs. Miller a bitch over the telephone and 
ignored Michael L. Miller's perjury. But when Mr. Bunderson was 
being considered for District Court Judge, he was prosecuting 
everybody that had a 'Wiener dog' and smoked heavily." (R.184). 
The district court's conclusion that Johnson acted in bad faith is 
not clearly erroneous. 
The law was clear that Bunderson was immune from suit, and 
that Johnson's claims were barred by his admitted non-compliance 
with the Governmental Immunity Act. The conclusion that Johnson's 
claims were without merit was therefore correct. The district 
court's second conclusion, that Johnson's claims were asserted in 
bad faith, was also supported by the circumstances of the case. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, an award of fees was mandatory: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
this Court has held that the document was not privileged. 
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(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1) , but 
only if the court: 
(a) Finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) The court enters in the record the reason 
for not awarding fees under the provision of 
Subsection (1). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The district court had before it sworn testimony as to the 
amount and reasonableness of time and costs expended in defending 
Bunderson. (R.266-73). The court also had before it appellant's 
objections (R.278-79), but found the amount claimed reasonable. 
(R.276). 
An attorney fee award was particularly appropriate in this 
case. The primary consideration underlying prosecutorial immunity 
is the avoidance of retaliatory lawsuits intended to waste public 
resources and influence the performance of public responsibilities. 
If disgruntled litigants are allowed to file such lawsuits without 
risk of sanction, those long-established policy aims will be 
undermined. The appellant was required to undertake a reasonable 
investigation of the law and facts prior to filing an action, 
U.R.Civ.P. II,3 an obligation which he plainly disregarded in this 
3
 Pro se litigants are not relieved from the obligations 
imposed upon licensed attorneys in litigating actions. Further, 
although plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is familiar with the 
judicial process. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, Case No. 880586-CA, 
June 5, 1989; Miller v. Johnson, Case No. 880324-CA (Utah Court of 
Appeals, March 31, 1989). 
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case. The district court's award of fees was appropriate, and 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, respondent Bunderson requests 
the Court to affirm the award of attorney fees entered by the 
district court. Bunderson further requests the Court to award it 
damages, including attorney fees, pursuant to U.R.A.P. 33 and costs 
pursuant to U.R.A.P. 34. 
DATED this jy" day of March, 1992. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
^ < ^ ^ * ^ 
Dale J. Lambert 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Bunderson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the P day of March, 1992, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
BUNDERSON were mailed, postage prepaid to: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 100 North 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Pro se Appellant 
Michael L. Miller 
20 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 399 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Respondent Mary Miller 
Debra J. Moore 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent Carolyn Smith 
^ ^ H w f c i 
Dale J.VLambert 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Bunderson 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1 
Memorandum Decis ion, September 16, 1991. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER 
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER, 
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L. 
MILLER, and JON J. BUNDERSON 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 900000339 
This matter came before the Court on various motions, 
including various Defendant's motions which essentially relate to 
reinstating claims against parties either dismissed or opposing 
motions to dismiss on parties who have not been dismissed. There 
are also motions for Declaratory Judgments, Motions in Opposition to 
the dismissal motions of various defendants. There are also motions 
for Summary Judgment filed on the part of Defendant Jon Bunderson, 
as well as Oppositions to the Defendant's Motion by Plaintiff and 
Oppositions to Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Judgment. Also, a 
Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment Motion. The Court having 
reviewed the material on file, issues the following Memorandum 
Decision: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court is of the opinion that the matter has been heard, 
that there is no basis for the action being pursued against any of 
the Defendants, accordingly, Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor 
of Defendant Jon Bunderson on the basis of prosecutorial immunity 
and failure by Plaintiff to comply with Utah Code 63-30-1. As a 
result thereof, in that matter attorneys fees are granted upon 
submission of an Affidavit outlining said fees to the Court. Any 
previous 
»
,c: ,of
.
,
.
l
-
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JOHNSON vs. 
SMITH, BEAR RIVER SOCIAL 
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900000339 
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orders entered by the Court dismissing any of the other Defendant's 
are hereby AFFIRMED by the Court and Motions to Vacate by the 
Plaintiff are DENIED. This action, as it relates to any remaining 
defendants, is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Counsel for Defendant Jon Bunderson to prepare an Order in 
conformance with this opinion as it relates to all Defendants. 
Ik DATED this /U) day of September, 1991. 
F.L: GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
0147e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid to the following: 
Dale J. Lambert, Karra J. Porter, Attorneys at Law, 175 S West 
Temple Suite 510, Salt Lake City UT 84101; Michael L. Miller, 75 E 
300 N #3, St. George UT 84770; and Gordon E. Johnson, 216 W 100 N, 
Brigham City UT 84302. 
DATED this^-J-4 day of September, 1991. 
iu/y^a 
Deputy Clerk 
0148e 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 2 
Order, September 30, 1991. 
BRIGHAN DISTRICT 
SEP 27 || 57 M '91 
Dale J. Lambert, 1871 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Jon J. Bunderson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. ; 
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER '] 
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER, ] 
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L. ] 
MILLER, and JON J. BUNDERSON, ] 
Defendants. ] 
ORDER 
i Civil No. 900000339 
The Court, having reviewed the material on file in this matter, 
and good cause appearing therefore, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff's claims against all 
defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56, the Court finds plaintiff's claims against defendant Jon 
Bunderson were without merit and not brought in good faith. 
Accordingly, defendant Bunderson is awarded reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred in defending plaintiff's claims against him. The 
Court finds that $1725.50 in fees and $101.41 in costs have 
reasonably been expended in defending Bunderson against plaintiff's 
. U C S G F U M E D SEP 3 0 1991 ' 
claims, and hereby enters judgment in favor of Bunderson and against 
plaintiff in the amount of $1826.91. 
' '*J_ , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED t h i s 30 day of (J/'jTjh 0)1 JUL 
^M. i^^yy^y^c^^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the /Zb(h daY °f September, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was mailed, 
postage prepaid to: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 100 North 
Brigham City, Utah 843 02 
Pro se plaintiff 
Michael L. Miller 
20 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 399 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Defendant Mary Miller 
JTwukp y^m^h 
